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ARE REPORTS OF BROWN ’S DEMISE EXAGGERATED?
PERSPECTIVES OF A SCHOOL DESEGREGATION LITIGATOR
DENNIS D. PARKER*
Hailed as a landmark in the history of America’s fight for free-
dom,1 the United States Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board
of Education2 helped to usher in an era of civil rights advances that
began in the field of education, but whose effects were subse-
quently felt in the areas of voting rights, housing, employment, and
public accommodation.  Fifty years later, the legacy of Brown has
increasingly been called into question by commentators, subjecting
both its past significance and future vitality to critical examination.
In considering whether Brown is “dead” — and ultimately con-
cluding that it is not — this paper will approach the Brown decision
and its progeny from a narrow and, perhaps, prosaic point of view.
That is, from the perspective of an attorney formerly involved in the
day-to-day litigation of school desegregation cases.3  First, I will ana-
lyze the Brown decision and the Court’s subsequent unwillingness
in Brown II to put in place remedies that would realize the ground-
breaking holding of Brown I.4  Then, I will examine Brown’s prog-
eny and the changes that occurred as a result of these decisions.
Finally, I will conclude that the Brown decision did not fail to meet
its goal of true equality, but that society and the courts failed to
implement and carry out that goal.
Given that I worked in New York and the overwhelming major-
ity of cases on the Legal Defense Fund docket were in southern
states, the perspective I gained in the course of working on school
* Bureau Chief, Civil Rights Bureau, Office of the New York State Attorney Gen-
eral.  J.D. Harvard Law School, 1980; B.A. Middlebury College, 1977.  The views ex-
pressed are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the Office of the New
York State Attorney General.
1. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY, Forward (1987).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (hereinafter “Brown I”).
3. This perspective results from fourteen years of involvement with school deseg-
regation cases on behalf of plaintiffs represented by the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc. in many school districts.
4. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (hereinafter “Brown II”).
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desegregation cases is necessarily that of an outsider.  Mindful of
this geographic reality and aware of the criticism leveled against im-
pact litigation brought by national organizations on behalf of com-
munities in which the organizations are not located,5 I do not
pretend to be the definitive voice of the communities I have repre-
sented.  The experience of litigating these cases, however, and
watching the way the decisions made by the United States Supreme
Court played out in individual school districts in Alabama or Geor-
gia, speak to questions about the strengths and weaknesses of
Brown, its progeny, and ultimately the failure of society to fully real-
ize its goals.
I. THE BROWN DECISION AND THE EFFECT OF BROWN II
The conclusion that Brown’s significance is more than purely
historic does not arise from the belief that the case successfully
eradicated all of the inferior educational conditions to which chil-
dren of color have been, and continue to be, subjected.  The persis-
tence of marked inequalities in American schools make such a
belief impossible.  Still, even in the face of the very real disparities
— and indeed because of their continued existence — Brown main-
tains its importance into the twenty-first century.  In fact, the condi-
tions frequently cited as signs of Brown’s failure are testaments to
another, more serious and continuing failure: the failure to imple-
ment the vision of true equality that the Brown decision articulated.
Significantly, the Supreme Court did not base its decision in
Brown on the differences in resources of the segregated black and
white schools then in existence.6  Although it defies credulity, the
5. See Derrick A. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideal and Client Interest in
School Desegregation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (suggesting that the institutional interest in
promoting integration espoused by organizations such as the Legal Defense Fund po-
tentially compromised the interests of clients in individual cases).  Although there may
be disagreement about the extent to which a gap existed between the goals of litigators
and the interests of clients, it cannot be gainsaid that tensions could and did arise in the
course of litigation.  Examples of this tension were many and ranged from concerns
about the desirability of transportation of students to achieve desegregated schools to
the fear of the loss of racial role models to policies of assignment of administrators and
faculty to schools that could not be identified as either black nor white but were instead
“just schools.” See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1, 12 (1971).
6. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 492 (stating that “our decision, therefore, cannot turn on
merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved
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lower courts found, and the Supreme Court accepted as fact, that at
least with regard to “tangible” factors such as buildings, curricula,
and the qualifications and salaries of teachers, the segregated
schools had been effectively equalized.7  Instead, the Court focused
on the intangible — the notion that segregation psychologically
damaged the children and no amount of equalization could erase
the fact that society would not view children of color as integral and
equal members of the schools or the greater community:  “To seg-
regate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely be-
cause of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.”8
Therefore, the “problem” with Brown was not that it sought to
address the wrong set of goals.  Rather, the difficulties arose in soci-
ety’s failure to adhere to its vision.  This deficiency resulted from a
failure of society to address the basic harm set out in Brown, result-
ing in too few children of color being accorded the respect and
fairness to which they are entitled.9  As I will argue, the progress of
desegregation and educational equity has been crippled by the fail-
ure to adequately address the issue of stigma and a growing indiffer-
ence by the federal courts to the constitutional harms suffered by
students of color.  Accordingly, although there have been clear ad-
in each of these cases.  We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public
education.”).
7. Id. at 493. See also Dana Robinson, A League of Their Own: Do Women Want
Segregated Sports? 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 321, 328-30 (1998) (stating that if the
Court had not required schools to be both tangibly and intangibly equal, states could
have created segregated environments where the tangible factors were equal but the
other intangible factors were not).
8. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495. See Robinson, supra note 7, at 329-31 (discussing how
the Court used the term intangible to encompass the feelings of “wrong and inferiority
associated with segregation”); Jaideep Venkatesan, Fatal in Fact? Federal Courts’ Applica-
tion of Strict Scrutiny to Racial Preferences in Public Education, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 173,
200-01 (2001) (discussing the duty of public schools to remove the vestiges of discrimi-
nation from the Brown era).
9. See Sam Dillon & Diana Jean Schemo, Charter Schools Fall Short in Public School
Matchup, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2004, at A21 (comparing charter schools with other pub-
lic schools and noting that charter schools have consistently performed below public
schools and that minorities attend charter schools in higher numbers); Editorial, Break-
ing the Hickory Stick, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2001, at A16 (discussing corporal punishment in
schools and asserting that minority and disadvantaged children are more likely to re-
ceive corporal punishment than other children).
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vances in many respects, all too often children of color are denied
their rightful place in schools and the community.10
Most of the school desegregation cases on the dockets of
courts throughout the south are decades old.11  The age of the
cases is undoubtedly a testament, in large part, to the message of
equivocation contained in the “all deliberate speed” language of
Brown II.12  The Supreme Court’s failure to set specific deadlines or
to articulate clearly the desegregation standards it expected sent a
clear message to school districts and states hostile to the notion of
integration that they need not fear immediate and effective require-
ments that they comply with the Court’s earlier order in Brown I.
Meanwhile, African Americans were left to question the value of the
constitutional rights of their children.
These questions turned out to be justified.  In virtually all of
the school desegregation cases, there was a period of at least a dec-
ade when African American parents and children saw little or no
change in their schools.13  Whether because of the outright defi-
ance of school districts and states, the adoption of freedom of
choice plans that afforded little real choice because of the hostility
of whites and the fear of retaliation by blacks, or the implementa-
tion of plans so riddled with exceptions as to be completely ineffec-
tive, “all deliberate speed” became tantamount to maintaining the
status quo.14
10. See Diana Jean Schemo, Sidestepping of New School Standards Is Seen, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 2002, at A21 (discussing schools’ reactions to President George W. Bush’s No
Child Left Behind Act).
11. See Tracy Dell’Angela & Tara Deering, Historic Ruling Just Fight’s Opening Bell;
School Battles in Rockford and Baton Rouge Show the Difficulty of Ending Racial Injustice, CHI.
TRIB., May 16, 2004, at C1 (discussing how desegregation cases have languished on the
docket of federal court judges in Louisiana for years).
12. 349 U.S. at 301. See, e.g., Robert B. McKay, With All Deliberate Speed: A Study of
School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1956).
13. See Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levison, Race-Based Remedies: Reshaping Remedial
Measures: The Importance of Political Deliberation and Race Conscious Redistricting: Why Voting
is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV 1201, 1230-31 (1996) (discussing the aftermath of the Brown
decision in segregated school systems).
14. See id.
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II. BROWN’S PROGENY
A period of significant change began in the late 1960s with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Green v. County School Board15 and
culminated with Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg16 in 1971.  In Green,
the Court recognized the various ways that discrimination could
manifest in school systems and required district courts to examine a
range of factors including, at a minimum, student assignment, facil-
ities, extracurricular activities, transportation, and faculty and
staff.17  Thereafter, Swann effectively empowered the lower courts
to construct desegregation plans, affording them a wide range of
discretion.18  Armed with these decisions, communities and their
advocates engaged in litigation on such issues regarding the loca-
tion of new schools and the closing of old ones, the redrawing of
attendance lines, and participation of African American students in
extracurricular activities.  Although these efforts did not withstand
the continued resistance from intransigent school districts, at least
the issues faced consideration among the courts.
Many of the successes achieved during the most effective pe-
riod of school desegregation in the 1970s and early 1980s addressed
the “tangibles” as represented by the factors articulated in Green.
Although the focus on these concrete examples of inequality were
undoubtedly necessary and often effective, whether these methods
sufficiently furthered Brown’s fundamental goal of eliminating
stigma is a question that still remains.  The emergence of “second
generation” issues such as in-school segregation in the form of
tracking and ability grouping, and disparities in the frequency and
severity of discipline for students of color demonstrates that the ba-
sic goal of Brown remains unrealized in many respects.
Further undercutting the realization of the goals set out in
Brown is the fact that the Supreme Court’s commitment to the im-
15. 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (holding that the school board must take “affirmative
action” to adopt a plan to desegregate the school system and rejected the school
board’s “freedom of choice plan” which had resulted in little or no desegregation).
16. 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (holding that a proposed plan that allowed some schools to
continue to be all or mostly one race should be closely scrutinized and the school board
had the burden to show that racial composition was not the result of discriminatory
practices either presently or in the past).
17. Green, 391 U.S. at 435-36.
18. Swann, 402 U.S. at 28-29.
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plementation of the Brown decision mandates not only came late,
but were relatively short-lived.19 Milliken v. Bradley20 effectively whit-
tled down the apparent breadth of the ability of the federal courts
to order relief in school desegregation cases.  In Milliken, the Su-
preme Court curtailed a district court’s remedial efforts to desegre-
gate Detroit by including white residents of surrounding school
districts, many of whom had fled the Detroit schools, in the deseg-
regation plan.21  The Supreme Court based the decision on the
principal that each of the suburban school districts should have re-
sponsibility for the unconstitutional desegregation,22 which severely
limited the ability of district judges to afford meaningful relief to
long-suffering plaintiffs in school desegregation cases.  The impor-
tance of the decision and its effect upon the promise of the Brown
decisions was not lost on the dissenting judges including Justice
Thurgood Marshall.  He reflected in his dissent that:
To suggest, as does the majority, that a Detroit-only plan
somehow remedies the effects of de jure segregation of the
races is, in my view, to make a solemn mockery of Brown
I’s holding that separate educational facilities are inher-
ently unequal and of Swann’s unequivocal mandate that
the answer to de jure segregation is the greatest possible
degree of actual desegregation.23
This decision was not the first to restrict the scope of the ability
of federal courts to address issues of inequality in schools.  The year
before Milliken, the Supreme Court decided San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez.24  While Milliken effectively hamstrung ef-
forts to obtain meaningful relief for findings of unconstitutional
discrimination, Rodriguez barred a class of underserved children
from receiving any judicial relief at all.25  In Rodriguez, minority stu-
19. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: Why
Integrationism Fails Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1410 (1993).
20. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
21. Id. at 744-45.
22. Id. at 773.  This principal effectively ignored the fact that the state of Michi-
gan, which had the ultimate responsibility for what happens in each of the school dis-
tricts in the state, had permitted the unconstitutional conduct to occur.
23. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 808.
24. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
25. Id. at 58-59.
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dents and children from low-income Texas school districts chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the disparities between those
districts and wealthier ones.26  In rejecting their claims and uphold-
ing the financing schemes that created the disparities, the Supreme
Court held first that people living in poverty were not a protected
class,27 and second that education was not a fundamental right for
purposes of heightened constitutional scrutiny.28
In Rodriguez and Milliken, the Supreme Court’s treatment of
the educational rights of the poor and their discussion of education
in general seemed in many ways fundamentally at odds with the
broad, democratic view of education outlined in the Brown
decision:
Today, [education] is a principal instrument in awaken-
ing the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust nor-
mally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if
he is denied the opportunity of an education.29
In many respects, therefore, Rodriguez and Milliken seemed to be-
tray the ideals of true equality established in Brown.30
As disturbing as both decisions were on their faces, one of the
more insidious things that emerged was a transformation of the way
that educational equality cases in general, and school desegregation
in particular, were viewed by the federal courts.  Whereas earlier
cases such as Swann and Green concentrated on the harm done to
students of color by unconstitutional discrimination and the need
to effectively address that harm, Milliken and Rodriguez shifted the
focus from that harm to the need for local school districts to exer-
cise authority over the schools they operated.
The strong concern about encroaching upon the authority of
school boards reemerged again in the 1990s in a trilogy of cases
26. Id. at 5, 19-20.
27. Id. at 26.
28. Id. at 35-36.
29. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493.
30. See Susan H. Bitensky, “We Had a Dream” in Brown v. Board of Education, 1996
DET. C. L. REV. 1, 15 (1996) (stating that “It is a composite of factors that have turned
Brown’s promise more into words of aspiration than commitment.  But Rodriguez, with-
out fanfare and under cover of Milliken . . . has figured into the process”).
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that contemplated the circumstances under which decades-old de-
segregation orders could be released from the supervision of fed-
eral courts.31  Each of these decisions pushed the constitutional
rights of minority children and their parents further into the
foreground.
The first of these cases, Board of Education of Oklahoma City v.
Dowell,32 while apparently addressing the need to eliminate vestiges
of illegal discrimination, made clear that even if a school system
had resegregated its schools so that it closely resembled its state
prior to the desegregation order, federal court supervision should
not necessarily continue.33  In recognizing that school districts
could be released from the active oversight of federal courts not-
withstanding the existence of pervasive segregation within the
schools, the Supreme Court made clear that the condition of deseg-
regation was weak and potentially short-lived.34
Further eroding the Brown mandate, the Supreme Court in
Freeman v. Pitts35 refused to hold school districts responsible for
school segregation that occurred while a desegregation order was
in effect if that segregation was due to “neutral” demographic fac-
tors.  The Supreme Court further permitted district courts to dis-
miss cases incrementally so that districts could be declared “unitary”
in one or more of the areas of student assignment, facilities, staff,
faculty, extracurricular activities or transportation.36  In many ways,
the decision seemed to operate in a theoretical realm largely di-
vorced from reality. Gone from the decision was the recognition of
the complex interaction of factors that affect housing patterns and
educational systems.37  Although there can be no real question that
31. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today,
52 AM. U. L. REV 1461, 1465-7 (2003) (discussing Board of Education of Oklahoma City v.
Dowell, Freeman v. Pitts, and Missouri v. Jenkins and concluding that “these three cases
together give a clear signal to the lower courts: the time has come to end desegregation
orders, even when the effect will be resegregation”). Id. at 1467.
32. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
33. Id. at 249-50.
34. See id. at 249.
35. 503 U.S. 467, 490-91 (1992) (holding that “federal courts have the authority to
relinquish supervision and control of school districts in incremental stages, before full
compliance has been achieved in every area of school operations”).
36. Id. at 487-89, 494.
37. Id. at 492 (identifying four factors that must inform the court when exercising
its discretion to order pretrial withdrawal, none of which explicitly acknowledge exter-
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schools play an important role in the choice of neighborhood,38
this central role was effectively ignored in the discussion of suppos-
edly “neutral” patterns of demographic development.39  Similarly,
the piecemeal dismissal process ignored certain realities of the op-
eration of schools.  Although courts in desegregation cases had
long recognized that the perception of schools as “black” or “white”
was shaped by the complex interaction of a variety of factors that
can be difficult to tease apart, the Court’s sanctioning of “partial
unitary status” undercuts the need to examine that complexity.40
Accordingly, the separation of the Green factors permitted by the
Supreme Court in Freeman ignores the myriad ways that the differ-
ent aspects of school operations work together to affect the experi-
ence of individual students in the system and the way that the
schools are regarded by the community as a whole.41
nal demographic factors, and emphasizing evidence of the school system’s “good faith
commitment” to compliance).
38. See Chemerinsky, supra note 31, at 1462 (asserting that desegregation and
merely adequate school funding “will not occur in most cities as long as parents have
the ability to move their children to suburban or private schools, where far more funds
are allocated to education than in inner cities”); see also Stephen Eisdorfer, Racial Ceil-
ings and School Choice: Public School Choice and Racial Integration, 24 SETON HALL L. REV.
937, 943 (1993) (observing that more affluent and educated families do not make
school choices on the basis of the distinctive educational characteristics of the various
schools, but on other considerations, such as location”) (citations omitted); Stephen
Sugarman, The Promise of School Choice for Improving the Education of Low-Income Minority
Children, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 403 (2004) (noting that middle-class and profes-
sional-class families “have long enjoyed school choice,” which they exercise by “moving
to a different school district, quite often in the suburbs, taking their children to a new
home where they think better schooling awaits them”) (citations omitted).
39. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494-95 (attributing population changes to a general
pattern of “mobility” that characterizes our society as a whole, and stating that the effect
of residential housing choices on the racial composition of schools is “too difficult to
address through judicial remedies”).
40. See Chemerinsky, supra note 31.  Chemerinsky articulates the problem as fol-
lows: “A crucial aspect of [Brown’s] wisdom was the importance of a unitary system of
education. Minority children are far more likely to receive quality education when their
schooling is tied to wealthy white children. The failure to create truly unitary systems is
the core explanation for the inequalities in American schools today.”  Id. at 1462 (cita-
tions omitted).
41. See id. at 1467-68 (noting the effects of disparities in school funding on enroll-
ment, availability and number of library resources, teacher experience and quality,
technology and computer resources, and parental involvement).
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Finally, the Supreme Court decided Missouri v. Jenkins,42 a case
that in some ways culminated the trend that narrowed the scope of
permissible relief started by Milliken.  In Jenkins, the Supreme Court
declared that the district court did not have the authority to order
the continued funding and implementation of programs designed
to enhance the educational achievement of minority students and
found that the original constitutional violation did not justify pro-
viding salary enhancements for teachers within Kansas City schools
for the purpose of increasing the “desegregative attractiveness” of
the schools.43  Having earlier deprived the students of the possibil-
ity of a desegregated education, the Supreme Court then deprived
them of educational enhancements that could have benefitted the
students or at least provided the possibility of changing the percep-
tion of the quality of the Kansas City system.44
Although the cases from Milliken to Jenkins appear to deal with
relatively arcane issues such as the proper scope of remedies or the
law governing the modification and dismissal of permanent injunc-
tions, the overall message sent to courts, advocates, and communi-
ties was clear: although the new round of Supreme Court cases did
not call for the wholesale dismissal of desegregation cases, courts
and those parts of the public frustrated by the continued presence
of these cases were provided a clear blueprint for terminating the
decades-old actions.45  On the other hand, even if they were not
aware of the shift in emphasis from the rights of those whose consti-
tutional rights were violated to the rights of the violators to reassert
control over the school systems, members of the class of plaintiffs
consisting of minority children eligible to attend public schools cer-
tainly recognized the growing pressure to close out the cases even
if, in the eyes of the minority communities, much work remained to
be done.46
42. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
43. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 94, 98-102.
44. Id. at 75-76 (noting that the district court adopted the plan because it believed
that the investments would be “so attractive” that they would draw non-minority stu-
dents from nearby private and suburban schools).
45. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 31, at 1464-67 (examining the holdings
of these cases and concluding that they “give a clear signal to lower courts: the time has
come to end desegregation orders, even when the effect will be resegregation”).
46. See Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means of Obtaining Sub-
stance, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 583 (1997) (stating that “In the area of school desegrega-
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III. THE FAILURE OF SOCIETY AND THE COURTS TO REALIZE THE
GOALS SET FORTH IN BROWN
Given the initial delay in implementing Brown, the relatively
short period of the its aggressive enforcement, and the accelerating
rate of dismissal of existing cases, the question of the actual impact
of these cases on the lives of individuals is an apt one.47  The argu-
ments that Brown did not help or even made things worse are famil-
iar.48  Significantly, the same arguments occur both in law journals
and community meetings: the unequal burdens of transportation
under which African American students were bused disproportion-
ately greater distances than were whites;49 the loss of talented and
caring African American teachers and administrators to discrimina-
tory faculty lay-off and reassignment policies; the closing of black
schools and the attendant loss of institutional anchors in African
American communities; the use of magnet programs which, among
other positive effects, might reasonably leave the demeaning feel-
ing that white students would have to be bribed to attend schools
with African Americans;50 and the fact that, fifty years after Brown,
tion, where the substantive right is one to class relief, we see perhaps most clearly the
political and social forces which operate on what in other contexts may be called only a
procedural issue.”).
47. See Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King’s Dream or Plessy’s
Nightmare (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/
reseg04/resegregation04.php.
48. See Erika Frankenberg & Chungmei Lee, Race in American Public Schools: Rapidly
Resegregating School Districts 5 (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.
harvard.edu/research/deseg/Race_in_American_Public_Schools1.pdf (finding that
since 1986, black and Latino students have become more racially segregated from
whites in their schools).
49. See Paul Boudreaux, Vouchers, Buses, and Flats: The Persistence of Social Segrega-
tion, 49 VILL. L. REV. 55, 63 (2004) (noting that in some areas, “the combination of
busing in the central city and the suburban insulation offered by Milliken has exacer-
bated social segregation and defeated the promise of Brown”). See generally Kenneth
O’Neill Salyer, Beyond Zelman: Reinventing Neighborhood Schools, 33 J. L. & EDUC. 283
(2004) (questioning whether busing students to achieve integration has been effective).
50. See Raquel Aldana, When the Free-Market Visits Public Schools: Answering the Roll
Call for Disadvantaged Students, 15 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 26, 51 (1997-1998) (discussing how
magnet school programs may increase, rather than decrease, segregation because mi-
nority families may not choose schools that contain predominantly white students be-
cause of a fear that their children will not be welcome or able to compete).
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too many African American children still do not receive equal edu-
cational opportunities.51
There is some level of truth to each of these beliefs but, at the
same time, they tell only a small part of the story.  First, it cannot be
gainsaid that the effects of Brown go far beyond the effects that were
felt in the individual school districts.  Indeed, in many instances,
defendant school districts or school boards involved in desegrega-
tion cases had some number of black administrators including, in
some instances, the superintendent of schools.  Moreover, boards
invariably included some African American members and some-
times were headed by African Americans.  Although the presence
of African Americans in the board room or at the central depart-
ment of education certainly did not assure that the defendants
would operate in good faith, the very presence of African Ameri-
cans represented a substantial change from the early days of
litigation.
Further proof of the value of the cases can be seen by the data
that suggested, to the extent meaningful desegregation was
achieved in any American school districts, it was primarily southern
school districts that practiced de jure segregation and faced desegre-
gation cases.52  The correlation between the peak era of desegrega-
tion in the schools and the period in the 1970s when the courts
most vigorously enforced desegregation orders demonstrates the
positive results obtained by Brown, as do the numerous studies dem-
onstrating positive educational and social outcomes from
desegregation.53
51. See Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Why Segregation Matters: Poverty and Educa-
tional Equality 4, 7 (Jan. 2005), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/
research/deseg/Why_Segreg_Matters.pdf (reporting on a “continuous pattern of deep-
ening segregation for black and Latino students” since the 1980s and that “attempt[s]
to resolve the achievement gap by funding equity or classroom size changes” would
probably fail if the segregation issue was not addressed).
52. See Orfield & Lee, supra note 47 (describing the patterns of desegregation that
occurred while school districts were under desegregation orders and the subsequent
trends toward re-segregation that followed the dismissal of desegregation cases).
53. See Derek Black, The Case for the New Compelling Government Interest: Improving
Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. REV. 923, 943-945 n.151-55 (2002) (citing numerous
studies concluding that racial diversity in educational settings result in a laundry list of
benefits for students of all ages including better teaching and learning, improved civic
values, increased employment opportunities, and higher achievement and educational
opportunities). See also Joanna R. Zahler, Lessons in Humanity: Diversity as a Compelling
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But perhaps the most dramatic positive result, though less visi-
ble in the larger debates, was the effect that the existence of the
cases had on the experience of individuals in each of the small com-
munities.  Notwithstanding the critical things said about the cases,
the fact remains that they often presented the best, and sometimes
only, means of addressing the day-to-day concerns of African Ameri-
can students and their parents.  In the “second generation” litiga-
tion that began in the 1970s and persist to some degree to this day
in desegregation litigation, courts have addressed a range of issues
that go far beyond the question of seating a black student next to a
white student.  Issues about the availability of gifted and talented
programs,54 disparities in the imposition of discipline,55 presence
on athletic teams or cheerleading squads,56 hiring and promoting
teachers and administrators of color,57 assignment to special educa-
State Interest in Public Education, 40 B.C. L. REV 995, 1023 (1999) (citing Jomills Henry
Braddock II & James M. McPartland, Social Psychological Processes that Perpetuate Racial
Segregation: The Relationship Between School and Employment Desegregation, 19 J. BLACK STUD.
267, 285-86 (1989) (concluding that African Americans, Latinos, and white students
who attend desegregated schools were more likely to work in racially-mixed work envi-
ronments than those who attend segregated schools)); Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity
Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 741 n.50 (1998)
(citing numerous studies that concluded African American students attain greater aca-
demic success in majority white schools than in predominantly or majority African
American schools, and the sooner an African American student is placed in a majority
white school or classroom, the higher the student’s academic achievement).
54. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 479 (noting that the desegregation plan included the
institution of “magnet” school programs for gifted and talented education including
performing arts programs, two science programs, and a foreign language program to
attract black students and increase the integrated learning experience).
55. See Johnson ex. rel. Johnson v. Bd. of Educ. of Champaign, 188 F. Supp. 2d 944
(C.D. Ill. 2002).  The court entered a consent order resolving school district desegrega-
tion, which approved a plan eliminating disciplinary and attendance disparities be-
tween races, and encouraged intervention as an alternative to discipline. Id. at 965.
56. See, e.g., Manning v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough County, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1277
(N.D. Fla. 1998) (litigating that there were not enough black cheerleaders); People
Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 851 F. Supp. 905, 929-30 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (finding
that the school district discriminated against minorities with regard to extracurricular
activities because the district failed to provide equal access to transportation and the
selection process for activities such as the cheerleading squad favored white students).
57. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 417 U.S. 424 (1976) (holding that
the school district had to comply with the procedures set forth in the desegregation
plan for hiring and promoting teachers and administrators.); Keyes v. School Dist. No.
1, Denver, CO., 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973) (stating that the school board had the burden
of justifying its conduct in a school system with a history of segregation where a dispro-
portionately large number of African American teachers had been discharged.).
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tion classes,58 and indeed even whether black schools would be
saved from closing59 have been litigated successfully in school de-
segregation cases.
Even with the gains that have been achieved, however, substan-
tial inequalities still exist. Because of this, perhaps the greatest indi-
cation of the continuing value of Brown to communities of color
can be seen in community reactions to the prospect of the dismissal
of the cases.  Faced with a release from federal court jurisdiction,
differences in the community about priorities in education litiga-
tion disappear.60  Although individuals disagree about issues such
as the value of integration or the utility of magnet school programs,
there is virtual unanimity about whether individual school districts
have earned the right to the relative autonomy that accompanies
unitary status declarations.  In those instances, my experience has
been uniform.  Communities of color in the overwhelming majority
of cases feel that school districts have not truly eliminated the
deeply entrenched vestiges of discrimination, even in those cases in
which the superficial and mechanistic standards articulated in the
later Supreme Court cases have been met.61  In those instances, the
58. See Ho by Ho v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that desegregation plan had to correct the over-representation of Afri-
can-American males in special education); Vaughns by Vaughns v. Bd. of Educ. of
Prince George’s County, 758 F.2d 983, 992-93 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that it was re-
versible error to fail to give effect to a presumption that placement disparities in special
education were casually related to prior segregation); Yarbrough v. Hulbert-West Mem-
phis School Dist., 380 F.2d 962, 965 (8th Cir. 1967) (holding that the desegregation
plan had to include the inauguration of a ‘completely integrated’ special education
program, with one white teacher and one African American teacher in a predominantly
white elementary school).
59. See Lee v. Autauga County Bd. Of Educ., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (M.D. Ala. 1999);
see also Stanley v. Darlington County School Dist,. 915 F. Supp. 764 (D. S.C. 1996).
60. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248 (affirming the district court’s ruling to dissolve a
desegregation decree despite the reintroduction of a neighborhood school system for
grades K-4).  The Court held that its decision properly recognized the importance of
local school system control and that a federal court’s regulatory control of such system
could not extend beyond the time required to remedy the effects of past intentional
discrimination. Id. See also Freeman, 503 U.S. 467 (approving a partial withdrawal of
judicial supervision from a Georgia school district despite the filing of a class action law
suit by African American students and their parents).
61. See Robert L. Hayman Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Constitutional Ghetto, 193 WIS. L.
REV. 627 (1993) (contending that the decisions in Dowell and Freeman undermine the
contemporary understandings of racism and refuting the suggestion that a historically
insignificant passage of time could transform de jure segregation into de facto segrega-
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prospect of the loss of even the possibility of relief in the federal
courts is a daunting one.
Ultimately, opponents of the dismissal of school desegregation
cases may have apprehended the most important aspect of Brown
that too often was lost in the struggles about the drawing of attend-
ance zone lines, construction of new schools, or the racial composi-
tion of individual schools.  Whether fighting for black
representation on cheerleading squads or, in the end, opposing the
termination of the federal court cases, the people in these commu-
nities actually protested the fact that the goal of eliminating the
stigma of African American students has not yet been reached and
that, fifty years after the Brown decision, African American students
are still not treated equally with white students.  Viewed from this
perspective, the failure is not Brown ’s but is instead ours in that the
courts and society as a whole have failed to realize the case’s vast
promise.
tion). See also Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the Con-
dition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521 (2002) (suggesting that if racial equality in
America is ever to be achieved affirmative action programs must be utilized to help
reduce the black-white test score gap); Hon. Gerald W. Heaney, Busing, Timetables,
Goals, and Ratios: Touchstones of Equal Opportunity, 65 MINN. L. REV. 735 (1985) (declar-
ing that now is not the time to do away with race based initiatives, such as affirmative
action, becausee the long-term effects of centuries of discrimination still linger today
and “purging the taint of racism requires more than color blindness and race neutrality
in a free market”).
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